THE TRUE STATE OF THE QUESTION.

It is the curſe of Kings to be attended
By Slaves, that take their humour for a warrant,
And on the winking of authority
To underſtand a law, to know the meaning
Of dangerous Majeſty, when perchance it frowns
More upon humour than adviſed reſpect.

SHAKESPEARE.

LONDON:

M.DCC.LXXXIV.

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The author is ſenſible how much inferior this little tract is, not only to the dignity and importance of the ſubject, but even to what it might have been had a little more time been allowed. The matter is too much contracted, and the ſtyle too diffuſe. Faults perhaps neceſſarily incident to every work written on the ſpur of fleeting occaſion.

THE TRUE STATE OF THE QUESTION.

THE preſent diſpute between the King and the Houſe of Commons is the univerſal topic in all ſocieties: It is as it ought to be, the leading idea in every man's mind; and however the converſation begins, it naturally ſlides into this great ſubject, for a great one it certainly is unleſs liberty and the conſtitution are become mere ſounds.

In liſtening to and partaking of theſe amicable altercations, I have obſerved with great ſurpriſe, that there are numbers who do not at all underſtand the ſtate of the queſtion: now as I think if ever any political queſtion could admit of being rendered ſimple and clear, it is that which at preſent is in diſpute, I muſt beg that ſuch as wiſh to decide upon it fairly and honeſtly, and are not predetermined that reaſon ſhall have no effect upon them, will liſten to what I have to ſay; I will be as ſhort as I can, and I will attempt no oratory, for I deſire not to perſuade, but to convince; and I will endeavour to aſſume no fact that is not univerſally allowed, nor to draw any concluſion that is not fair and obvious.

The actual government was fixed at the Revolution. The tyranny and bigotry of the King had diſſolved the contract between him and the people. A new King was called; but before the crown was conferred upon him, ſuch reſtriction of the prerogative, and ſuch declarations of the rights of the people were inſiſted upon as might for the future confine the royal power within its due bounds. Little or no alteration was made in the form or theory of

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government; but every proviſion was made, that the wiſdom or temper of the times allowed of, to ſecure the independency of parliament, and the liberties of the people.

No part of the ſyſtem then eſtabliſhed ſeems to have been better underſtood or more happily conceived than that which regarded * *the adminiſtration of government.* The whole executive power reſides virtutually in the King; this is the very eſſence of the conſtitution, one of the fundamental pillars of the edifice; he can therefore be amenable to no law, becauſe for a man to ſit in judgment upon himſelf implies a contradiction. In his legiſlative capacity, as a third independant eſtate, he is not accountable to the other two, any more than they are reciprocally to him or to each other. Thus the ſentence of the law, "that the King can do no "wrong," is not an old legal adage founded

* The adminiſtration of government is generally more eſſential to public liberty than the form itſelf. Or, to ſtate it otherwiſe, that form is the beſt which contains in itſelf the beſt ſecurity for being well adminiſtered; for almoſt all forms are good when adminiſtered in the perfection of their ſeparate principles.

ed on obſolete notions of prerogative, but a poſitive maxim of fact deriving neceſſarily from the principles of the conſtitution. But for the King to exerciſe the various executive powers in his own perſon, is not only phyſically impoſſible, but muſt, ipſo facto, deſtroy the ſhadow of a balance between the three eſtates. The immediate command of the army, the navy, the unlimited power of creating peers, a power which exerted in the extent, gives the crown an abſolute controul over that houſe, and above all the diſpoſal of an immenſe patronage of honours and emoluments, muſt if exerciſed in the perſon of a magiſtrate reſponſible for none of his actions, have rendered that magiſtrate the moſt deſpotic ſovereign in Europe. The expedient adopted, was ſimple, obvious, and adequate. Theſe powers were ſeparately delegated to perſons appointed by the King, and acting under his authority, but reſponſible to the laws and the legiſlature*, and to

* Almoſt immediately after feudal anarchy had ſubſided into a more ſettled form, the adminiſtration of public juſtice had been delegated by the crown to the judges of the land; and it is well worthy of remark, that tho' the

to the appointment of whom the ſanction of parliament was an indiſpenſable requiſite, becauſe, parliament having it in their power to withold the ſupplies, would only grant them to ſuch men as had their approbation. Thus miniſters became public men, reſponſible to Parliament for their conduct, and looking up to Parliament for ſupport; and not as in deſpotic governments, the mere inſtruments of the will of an arbitrary maſter. Such was the ſyſtem of adminiſtration eſtabliſhed at the revolution, and continued without change, or diminution thro' four ſucceſſive reigns, to the death of the late King; and I will venture to aſſert, that every reaſoning and impartial man, who will begin by examining the probable efficacy of this ſyſtem for the preſervation of public liberty and the independance of parliament, and will then trace its operation thro' the period above

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the judges derive their authority ſo immediately from the King, that they are feigned when in commiſſion actually to repreſent his perſon, yet ſo great has been the jealouſy of his interference in the execution of this department, that it is eſtabliſhed by law that the Judges ſhall not be amoveable at the royal will, and even their ſalaries are determined by Parliament.

above mentioned, will not hesitate to pronounce it the great palladium of the constitution. For those who are not disposed to enter upon such an investigation suffice it to observe, that from the institution of this system in 1688 to the essential alteration made in it in 1760, the history of the world cannot furnish an instance of a nation more mildly more peaceably more equitably governed; more happy and prosperous at home, or more gloriously successful abroad, than is presented by the annals of Great Britain during the 72 years immediately succeeding this great æra of the constitution; and that from the hour this system was to be undermined, to make way for that which it is now proposed to ratify and avow, the country has declined with a rapidity which has no example.

His present Majesty ascended the throne of his ancestors with advantages unknown to the most fortunate of his predecessors. As a man his felicity was such that nothing was left for the poets of that time to imagine.—At his birth

"Nature and Fortune join'd to make him great."

As a Monarch he was the idol of a glorious, prosperous and happy nation. His

arms

arms victorious in every quarter of the globe; his adminiſtration conducted by one of the honeſteſt and ableſt ſtateſmen that ever exiſted, poſſeſſing the unbounded confidence of the parliament, and the people. —When I contemplate this bright picture, and then turn to the dark ſcene which follows —When I conſider what might have been, and what is—How, and for what objects theſe advantages are ſacrificed—It is difficult indeed to preſerve the temper which decency requires.

Lord Bute was a man of perſonal ambition, of tory principles, and narrow views. He felt that under the ſyſtem of parliamentary adminiſtration the Crown was not ſufficiently predominant in the ſtate for his purpoſes; and he ſaw in that ſyſtem the perpetual excluſion of his own pretenſions to that abſolute Miniſtry to which he aſpired; unfortunately for the nation he did not foreſee that he was preparing for himſelf an early diſgrace to be followed by long years of remorſe and gloomy ſolitude; and for his Sovereign, a turbulent and ——— reign.

William Pitt, at that time in the meridian of his glory, a figure that filled the

eye of the univerſe, was marked out as the firſt ſacrifice to Lord Bute's raſh and ill-conducted enterpriſe; nor was his fall difficult to accompliſh. Conſcious of ſuperior ability and purity of intention, he had contented himſelf with the confidence of parliament, and the regard of his honeſt ſovereign; and had diſdained, or at leaſt neglected to conciliate the good will of his aſſociates in office with perhaps too much haughtineſs. Theſe men were eaſily perſuaded to join in his overthrow. They felt themſelves overſhadowed by his greatneſs, and were not ſorry to emerge into day. In Lord Bute they beheld a figure which gave them no jealouſy of leading parts or party conſequence, and they were forward to court the favour of their young ſovereign by receiving amongſt them a man who was honoured with the title of his friend. The great William Pitt was driven out of office to make way for Lord Bute with no more buſtle that attends the moſt ordinary occurrence.

A very ſhort time was ſufficient to convince thoſe men how egregiouſly they had been duped. If their high ſpirit and great national character had borne with impa-

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tience the predominancy of Mr. Pitt's name and extraordinary abilities, what muſt have been their feelings to find themſelves arrogantly dictated to by a man without abilities without experience without a name without party weight or public confidence? for a while they ſtood aſtoniſhed in ſtupid amazement; and when they were beginning to recollect themſelves, Lord Bute threw off the maſk at once, and ſtarted up in his own ſhape confeſt. Intoxicated with his ſucceſs in turning out Mr. Pitt he kept no meaſures. He ſeized the reins and vaulted into the car. Men of the higheſt character, and greateſt party weight, whoſe anceſtors had placed the royal family on the throne, and who had been themſelves its firmeſt ſupport, were driven from the royal preſence with the moſt galling marks of inſult and contempt. Situations of the greateſt truſt and honour were committed to men whoſe very names were unknown, and to obſcure and hungry Scotchmen; and perſonal and unconditional allegiance to the favorite was openly declared to be the only terms upon which thoſe men who ſhould be found baſe enough to deſert their princi-

ples and their party could hope to be received into favour. Such mad precipitancy is hardly to be paralleled.

Quos perdere vult Jupiter prius dementat.

His head grew giddy with the height—and down fell this phaeton favorite never to riſe again.

It would have been happy if the miſchief had ſtopped here.

The young unſuſpecting ingenuous mind of the Prince, under an authority of all others the moſt prevalent with a good heart, had received impreſſions which at an early age are apt to ſink ſo deep as to become the moſt irradicable prejudices.

Lord Bute retired from public view, but his principles and his creatures remained in the cabinet; and have more or leſs directed or counteracted all its meaſures to the preſent hour. The eſtabliſhment of immediate and perſonal influence has been the leading principle during the whole of the preſent reign; to this every view has been directed; to this every ſet of men have been ſacrificed in their turn, without heſitation or remorſe, as ſoon as they would no longer ſubmit to be diſhonoured by its operation, or had become the exe-

cration of the public by acquieſcing in its deſtructive meaſures*. It does not come within the compaſs of my plan to trace this baleful principle thro' the long detail of its dark manœuvres for more than twenty years†; and it is fully ſufficient for my argument that no body denies or doubts its exiſtence.

Since the employment of the immediate and perſonal influence of the crown has

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* Lord North continued long in office becauſe he was pledged for the continuance of the American war which was a favourite court meaſure. For the laſt years he was in that unhappy predicament which leaves only the choice of evils—He could neither remain in office with credit or ſelf-approbation, or reſign with honour. This was the triumph of ſecret influence.

† Lord Rockingham and the ſhattered remains of the whig party were forced into office by the voice of the people, and they were forced out of office by the operation of ſecret influence. In the apology for their reſignation publiſhed under the title of "Cauſes of the preſent Diſcontents" the eloquent author expoſes the ſyſtem of ſecret influence with that elegance of diction and perſpicuity of argument for which he is ſo remarkable. This ſyſtem was not at that time generally underſtood. Mr. B's expoſition of it was then regarded as the refinement of an ingenious imagination. It would at preſent be ridiculed for telling what all the world knows.

has been more openly avowed, attempts have been made to juſtify its principle. The crown lawyers, a deſcription of men ever unfriendly to liberty, have of late affected to talk in high terms of the *right* which the King has to exerciſe his prerogative*. But this word *right* has two ſignifications which it is very dangerous to confound. In one ſenſe a man is ſaid to have a *right* to do all that is not forbidden by the laws, however contrary to ſenſe and juſtice: in the other he is ſaid to have no right to do even what the law allows if it be contrary to the dictates of reaſon and morality. On the former interpretation the moſt extravagant and criminal exceſſes may be juſtified. As for example ——

The King has an undoubted *right* to create as many peers as he pleaſes—founded on this right an expedient offers itſelf in

* I would recommend it to Chancellors and Attorneys, and Solicitor's General when they threaten us with the latent rights of prerogative, not to loſe ſight of another right which they are too apt to forget—a right founded in nature, unalienable and antecedent to every human inſtitution—I mean the right of the people to defend their liberties, when attacked, by ſuch means as God has put into their hands.

in the preſent emergency. By calling the majority of the commons up to the peers, till the new writs can be returned, parliament will remain at the diſpoſal of the new miniſtry; and this furniſhes time enough to paſs ſuch laws as may ſecure for ever the independence of the crown and their own political exiſtence. — I am almoſt aſhamed to employ irony on ſo grave a ſubject. —— But ſeriouſly, has not the King a *right* to create as many peers as he pleaſes? and have not the parliament a right to paſs what laws they think proper? and yet to what monſtrous abſurdities may not the exerciſe of theſe rights lead!

But what then is the criterion by which we are to diſtinguiſh right from power. In private individuals it is honour and conſcience; and in the governors of the people it is the public advantage; every exerciſe of power, therefore, which has not the public good for its object, however ſupported by theory or by whomſoever exerciſed, is arbitrary and illegitimate.

But to return to the more immediate object of this addreſs. I have endeavoured to ſhew that the eſtabliſhment of immediate and perſonal influence upon the ruins

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of public parliamentary reſponſible adminiſtration has been the great object of the preſent reign—that the latter is a ſyſtem admirably calculated to ſecure the independency of parliament and the rights of the people, without endangering the juſt prerogative of the crown—and that the former tends evidently to ſubvert the independency of parliament and the liberties of the people by throwing the whole weight of power into the hands of the King. Now no man will have the effrontery to deny that the laſt adminiſtration were forced into power by the ſole efficacy of parliamentary ſupport in direct oppoſition to ſecret influence which they ſtood pledged to detect and reſiſt in all its forms. Hence the reluctant delay with which they were at firſt admitted into office — hence the artful and ſucceſsful attempt to break their force by tempting Lord Shelburne with a bait which he had not ſtrength of mind to reſiſt—hence the rage and deſpair occaſioned by the coalition, which once more enabled parliamentary ſupport to take perſonal influence by ſtorm as it has been emphatically expreſſed by the creatures of the latter—and hence the laſt deſperate exer-

exertion of ſecret influence over a few Lords of the Bedchamber to throw a bill out of parliament which had been brought in by the king's miniſters, and had paſſed the commons three to one; and to remove an adminiſtration in the plenitude of parliamentary ſupport, to make way for a ſet of men who have ſworn allegiance to that influence to which they owe their political exiſtence.

Mr. Pitt you are a very young man, and it is the characteriſtic of ingenuous youth to be open and unſuſpecting. You poſſeſſed a character till now ſpotleſs, a great hereditary name, and the reputation of knowledge and ability far above your years; and you are followed by a ſet of men juſt ſtepping into the world, of whom as nothing is known nothing ill can be ſpoken. Such a deſcription of perſon was perhaps the only inſtrument the king could have employed with ſucceſs on the preſent occaſion. More experience would have preſerved you from becoming the dupe of the moſt hackneyed arts; and with leſs character your name could not have been held out as a ſucceſsful lure to the people. But let me beſeech you, Sir, in the name

of this wretched ruined country to conſider well what you do. The eyes of the univerſe are turned towards you, and a ſplendid name and high character are ſurely worth deliberation! I know they are as difficult to ſupport as they are rare and valuable; but they may be loſt irretreivably by a ſingle act in a ſingle inſtant. Examine therefore by what arts and on what motives your great father was firſt diſmiſſed from office, how his adminiſtration was afterwards rendered impotent and abortive, and why the virtuous Lord Rockingham was obliged to reſign? Compare the arts then employed, and the objects then propoſed with the preſent circumſtances, obſerve in what they differ in practice or deſign*, and do not miſtake the voice of a party heated by the occaſion, and the cry of intereſted individuals for the calm deliberate approbation of the public. Within the ſhort period of

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* Mr. Pitt is ſaid to have urged the perſonal ſolicitation of his ſovereign as a principal motive for coming into office. The late Mr. Charles Yorke accepted the ſeals becauſe he could not reſiſt royal ſolicitation. What was the conſequence?

a few days you have it in your choice either to ſet a ſeal on the public good opinion, or to damn yourſelf to everlaſting fame.

Let me entreat you, Sir, to proceed no farther in this buſineſs; the people have honoured you of late,

> —— and you have bought
> golden opinions of all ſorts of men,
> which ſhould be worn now in their neweſt gloſs,
> not caſt away ſo ſoon ——

But ſhould you lend the authority of your name to the final triumph and eſtabliſhment of the perſonal influence of the King on the ruins of parliamentary adminiſtration, your virtues will have been more fatal to the liberties and the conſtitution of your country than the vices of all your predeceſſors ſince the revolution.

I have very willingly given you the credit of ſuppoſing you actuated only by great public conſiderations; otherwiſe it would be eaſy to point out to you on what hollow and dangerous ground the intereſt of your perſonal and private ambition at preſent ſtands. All paſt example ſhows you how unfriendly the ſituation of miniſter is to the affection of the people; you therefore can hardly flatter yourſelf that an exception will be made in your favour in times ſo peculiarly diffi-

cult as the preſent; but if it could, you may reſt aſſured that the moment your popularity has ſerved the turn, it will become an immediate object of jealouſy to the K—, to the junto, and to the greateſt part of your heterogenious aſſociates in office; and that if you were ever to venture to reſt upon it to carry any great public meaſure into force which had not the thorough approbation of theſe perſons, that inſtant your doom would be ſealed; on the firſt nod of the maſter the mutes of the Bedchamber and interior Cabinet would ſtand ready to give you the bow-ſtring with as little remorſe and as much ſatisfaction as they juſt ſtrangled the laſt of Britiſh miniſters.

The queſtion therefore is not whether it be expedient to diſpoſſeſs the Eaſt-India company of its territorial or commercial powers—not whether Mr. Pitt or Mr. Fox be the honeſter or abler man, or whether Lord Gower or the Duke of Portland has the higher character for political integrity — theſe queſtions are all irrelevant to the preſent ſubject, and thoſe who put them forward as main points are either deceived themſelves or endea-

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vour purpoſely to miſlead the attention of others. No, the ſole object in diſpute, it cannot be too often repeated, is whether the ſyſtem of a parliamentary reſponſible adminiſtration ſhall be reſtored, a ſyſtem which for a period of 70 years our government was the envy of nations, and we became the firſt people in the univerſe; or that fatal error ratified and continued, which during an operation of 20 years has led us thro' a long and uninterrupted ſeries of folly and diſhonour, from the pinacle of glory and proſperity to the brink of infamy and deſtruction.

Not but that the late miniſters might meet the preſent men with equal advantage on all theſe colateral points as on the main queſtion. Nay the very India-bill itſelf, againſt which ſo much popular clamour has been artfully excited, this ſtrong hold of the new cabinet, and the manner in which it was brought into parliament, furniſh the ſtrongeſt inſtance of the adherence of the late adminiſtration to their great principle; and ought alone to ſecure to them the perpetual confidence of the nation. Had Mr. Fox brought forward a trimming half-formed abortive meaſure,

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placing the patronage in the crown, and ſacrificing part of the object of the bill to gain the ſupport or ſtop the clamour of intereſted individuals, no pretext had then been furniſhed for what afterwards happened, and what it was too well foreſeen would be attempted*; the evil indeed would not have been remedied, and millions of people might have continued to groan under oppreſſions that make a good man aſhamed of his humanity; but a ſpecious palliative might have been held forth, and miniſters would have kept their offices, at leaſt till ſome new and more ſubtile poiſon could be prepared, or ſome unguarded hour had furniſhed a ſafer opportunity for an unſeen hand to direct the ſtilleto to their hearts. But they ſcorned ſuch paltry motives—they boldly ſtepped forward with ſuch

* After the game that had been played when the P. of W.'s eſtabliſhment was ſettled, miniſtry knew for certain that arts would be employed againſt which, till they had had experience of them, no men of the leaſt honour or liberality of ſentiment could poſſibly be prepared. The *conſpiracy* was for that time rendered abortive by the noble and manly conduct of a great perſonage who raiſes the warmeſt hopes in the breaſts of Engliſhmen.

ſuch a bill as they thought adequate to the evil, without regard to party clamours or the certainty that every poſſible advantage would be taken of theſe clamours to drive them out of office on a plauſible and popular pretence. They treated the diſeaſe, not with the flattering unction of a timid and ignorant pretender,

> —— to ſkin and film the ulcerous part
> while rank corruption mining all within
> infects unſeen ———

but with a firm and ſteady hand; probing the ſore to the bottom and amputating the rotten parts to preſerve to whole maſs from mortification.

The objections to Mr. Fox's bill, upon which the clamours have been excited are,

That it takes away chartered rights;

That it places a great weight of patronage in unſafe or improper hands;

That it trenches on the prerogative of the crown.

The firſt of theſe objections implies to much ignorance of the firſt principles of legiſlation in general, and of the ſpirit of the Britiſh conſtitution in particular that it hardly deſerves a ſerious anſwer. Are

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we to be told, that when any rights of which individuals are left in poſſeſſion by the law become incompatible with the public ſafety, it is not only the right but the immediate duty of the legiſlature to remove them?—That a grant from the crown of a monopoly of thoſe rights neither does nor can fence the rights themſelves from parliamentary regulation?—That if the rights themſelves may be regulated or taken away *a fortiori* the monopoly of them may be reſtrained or reſcinded?—&c. &c. If this is not demonſtrable I know nothing that is ſo.

The anſwer to the ſecond objection has always appeared to me equally obvious and ſimple. The corruption and incapacity of the company's government was the evil which the bill was to remedy; in tracing the cauſes of this diſorder, it was found not ſo much to proceed from mal-adminiſtration as from a radical fundamental error in the government itſelf. An *imperium in imperio* has always been eſteemed a ſoleciſm in politics, but imperial juriſdiction in a trading company implies a mon-

monſtrous contradiction of contending and irreconcileable principles from which the worſt kind of tyranny muſt neceſſarily reſult. The ſole principle of a commercial company is *gain*; and the ſole principle of every juſt government ought to be *to ſecure the proſperity of the people governed.* Now is it not obvious that theſe two principles muſt remain at perpetual variance; and that the former will always prevail over the latter? If this reaſoning is juſt, and I think it is unanſwerable, it follows; that the firſt preliminary ſtep to the relief of the Eaſt Indies was to remove every part of government out of the hands of the company; and the queſtion only remained, where theſe powers were to be placed. But after the vote "that the influence "of the crown had encreaſed, was en-"creaſing and ought to be diminiſhed," with what ſort of conſiſtency could the ſame houſe of commons propoſe to place in the hands of the crown a patronage magnified as ſo great and dangerous? And if a power has grown up in the ſtate which it is conceived may be em-

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ployed for unconſtitutional purpoſes, where can that power be ſo ſafely depoſited as in the hands of the repreſentatives of the people? While the good underſtanding between the King and the commons ſhall ſubſiſt, there is no fear of the crown's wanting a due influence in that houſe; and if it is to ceaſe, and the powers of each inſtead of co-operating through the medium of a parliamentary adminiſtration are to be oppoſed to each other, where is the Engliſhman who would heſitate which hands to ſtrengthen? Or where is the man of common underſtanding who can ſuppoſe that the rights of the people are dearer to the crown than to their own immediate repreſentatives?

On the laſt objection I ſhall only obſerve that the different branches of the legiſlature have reſerved to themſelves various executive powers. The ſupreme judicature of the Lords — the competency of both houſes to try and puniſh certain offences—and above all the power of arraigning miniſters are all high executive powers; thoſe therefore who

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reaſon merely from the theory of the conſtitution will on this occaſion as almoſt on all others find their concluſions wide of the fact.

One word on the diſſolution of Parliament and I have done. The friends of the court-party affect to treat this meaſure as the moſt ſimple and natural occurrence; and to wonder why there ſhould be the leaſt heſitation in the king's miniſters on adopting ſo obvious and eaſy a reſource in the preſent difficulty. But is this meaſure really ſo wiſe and expedient? Is there nothing *arbitrary* in diſſolving a parliament merely for voting with the king's miniſters one day and not voting againſt the ſame men the next?

Is there nothing *dangerous* in diſſolving parliament in the beginning of a ſeſſion, when the finances are in the moſt ruinous ſituation, when public credit is at the loweſt ebb, when no appropriation has been made of the new ſupplies, when the public offices muſt all ſtop payment or iſſue monies in direct oppoſition to law, and when the

laſt great dependency we have remaining is on the eve of being loſt for want of immediate regulation?

Is there nothing *miſchievous* in renewing the neceſſary evils of a general election, and creating ſo much its blood in every part of the nation?

Is THERE NOTHING UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN DISSOLVING A PARLIAMENT NOT SUFFICIENTLY OBEDIENT TO THE ROYAL PLEASURE, SOLELY AND AVOWEDLY IN THE HOPE OF OBTAINING THRO' THE INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN A NEW PARLIAMENT MORE OBEDIENT TO THE ROYAL WILL?

When theſe queſtions ſhall be anſwered with proof in the affirmative, I ſhall then ceaſe to conſider the diſſolution of the preſent parliament in the preſent moment as a meaſure as dangerous and unconſtitutional as any thing that the hiſtory of this country can furniſh in the worſt of times.

It has too frequently been the misfortune of mankind not to ſee the danger till the miſchief has actually taken place, and it is too late for redreſs. Should the perſonal influence of the crown triumph

umph over parliament, our ſons will perfectly underſtand how their liberties were loſt; but they will not perhaps ſo readily diſcover by what means they are to be regained.

Before I take my leave I ſhall ſtate certain *axioms* which may ſerve as a recapitulation of the ſubject; and which I earneſtly recommend to the attention of the public.

That the ſyſtem of a ſtrong reſponſible parliamentary adminiſtration is excellently calculated to preſerve the conſequence of parliament and the rights of the people.

That the ſyſtem of ſecret and perſonal influence tends to ſubvert the conſtitution, to ſet the three eſtates at variance, and to endanger the liberties of the people.

That the late miniſtry owed their exiſtence ſolely to the ſupport of parliament.

That the preſent miniſtry owe their exiſtence ſolely to the exertion of the ſecret and perſonal influence of the crown.

That

That it is the indiſpenſible duty of parliament to ſupport ſuch men only as they approve of.

That to diſſolve the parliament merely for doing its duty would be an abſurd, dangerous, and unconſtitutional exertion of the prerogative.

FINIS.